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1 .  Introduction 
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Too and Enough Constructions (T&E) have traditionally been analyzed as 
comparative constructions which relates an actual degree to a modalized one (cf. 
Heim 2000, Meier 2003) .  In ( I )  for instance, Mary's  age would be compared to 
an age at which she can drive: 
( I )  a .  Mary i s  old enough t o  drive 
b. Mary is too young to drive 
Karttunen ( 1 97 1  ) first pointed out that T &E can sometimes have 
' implicative' readingsl , implying that their complement holds (in the case of 
enough}-or fails to hold (in the case of too}-in the actual world, instead of 
merely holding in some possible world(s). In uttering (2) for example, the speaker 
seems to imply that Jean actually left early (contrast this inference to the (lack of) 
inference that Mary actually drives in ( I a)): 
(2) Jean was clever enough to leave early 
This implication appears to be defeasible ((2) could be followed by a sentence 
asserting that, for some reason, Jean didn't leave) suggesting that this inference is 
of a pragmatic nature. This is in fact the line pursued in Meier (2003), which 
argues that implicative readings like that of (2) are determined by context: the 
modality in (2) would involve a completely realistic accessibility relation, which 
only picks out the actual world, and thereby guarantees that the complement holds 
in the actual world. 
However, once we tum to the French counterpart of T&E, we observe that 
this implication cannot just be pragmatic, as it is grammatically encoded. Indeed, 
in French, implicative readings only emerge in the Past tense2, with matrix 
perfective aspect (passe compose'), as in (4), while imperfective aspect (imparfait) 
gives rise to non implicative readings, as in (3). Note furthermore that the 
implication that arises with perfective aspect is not cancelable: 
(3) a. Jean Mait assez rapide pour s' enfuir (mais il ne s 'est pas enfui) 
'Jean was-impf quick enough to escape (but he didn't escape) ' 
b. Jean etait trop lent pour s 'enfuir (mais il s 'est enfui) 
' Jean was-impf too slow to escape (but he still escaped) ' 
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(4) a. Jean a ete assez rapide pour s 'enfuir (#mais il ne s'est pas enfui) 
' Jean was-pfv quick enough to escape (#but he didn't  escape)' 
b. Jean a ete trop lent pour s'enfuir (#mais il s 'est enfui) 
'Jean was-pfv too slow to escape (#but he still escaped) ' 
English doesn't have an aspectual distinction in the past tense, hence (2) is 
ambiguous between a perfective and an imperfective reading, blurring the fact 
that implication and aspect are correlated and that, with the right aspect, the 
implication is not defeasible. The French data however cast serious doubt on a 
purely contextual account, which should in principle allow the implication to be 
cancelled (e.g., by forcing the context to provide another accessibility relationl 
Because of the robustness of this implication in the perfective I propose 
that T&E are at base implicative (in the sense of Karttunen ( 197 1 )) .  Non 
implicative readings are derived through a genericity operator, whose presence is 
reflected by imperfective morphology, following Bhatt's ( 1 999) analysis of the 
ability modal. Thus, the base meaning is only apparent in the perfective. 
2. A Closer Look at the Data: Two Puzzles 
As we have seen in the introduction, the first puzzle that needs to be addressed is 
why, in French, implicative readings of Too and Enough constructions (T&E) are 
associated with perfective aspect, and non implicative ones with imperfective 
aspect. A second related puzzle, which concerns the behavior of perfective T &E 
under negation, will come up in section 2.2.  
2. 1 .  Aspect and Implication 
What is it about (im)perfective aspect that makes T &E (non-)implicative? A 
predecessor for this peculiar interaction of aspect and implication was discovered 
by Bhatt ( 1 999), who showed that the ability modal is implicative with perfective 
aspect and non implicative with imperfective aspect, as illustrated in (5): 
(5) a. Jean a pu soulever cette table, #mais il ne l'a pas soulevee 
'Jean could-pfv. lift this table, #but he didn't lift it' 
b. Jean pouvait soulever cette table, mais il ne l 'a  pas soulevee 
'Jean could-impf lift this table, but he didn't lift it' 
In Bhatt's  (1 999) analysis, the ability modal is at base implicative (in his 
account (Sa) is roughly equivalent to 'Jean managed to lift this table '). Non 
implicative readings arise from the presence of a genericity operator, which 
doesn't require verifying instances. In languages that have an overt aspectual 
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distinction, genericity is morphologically encoded by the imperfective, which is 
why, according to Bhatt's proposal, non implicative readings of the ability modal 
show imperfective aspect. 
When we turn to English T &E we can see that the non-implicative 
readings are also linked to genericity. Recall that in English certain T &E seem 
implicative (cf. Karttunen 1 97 1 ), while others don't. Contrast (6a) and (6b): 
(6) a. (Yesterday) Jean was clever enough to escape 
b. (In general) Jean was clever enough to solve math problems 
Intuitively, (6a) and (6b) differ in that the former is most easily read as an 
episodic, whereas the latter favors a generic reading. Note however that in 
English, aspect is not overtly specified. Thus, while (6a) favors an episodic 
reading, it can be (re)interpreted generically. French doesn' t  have this option, as 
aspect is overtly specified. Under the assumption that the non implicative 
readings are always associated with imperfective morphology, we can see how in 
English a seemingly implicative T&E can systematically be (re)interpreted as a 
non implicative (hearers can reinterpret covert aspect as imperfective instead of 
perfective), while in French the implication is not cancelable. 
Further evidence for the link between non implicative readings and 
genericity comes from the interpretation of Bare Plurals, which can be used to 
diagnose the presence of a genericity operator. Contrast the following: 
(7) a. (Yesterday) students were clever enough to leave the party early 
b. (Back in the days) students were clever enough to leave parties early 
(7a) favors a Past episodic interpretation in which the bare plural subject is 
existentially interpreted. With this interpretation, there seems to be an actuality 
entailment (there are students who left the party early). (7b), on the other hand, 
favors a generic interpretation, with a generically-interpreted subject (referring to 
students as a kind, cf. Carlson 1 977). With this interpretation, there is no actuality 
implication, providing support to the hypothesis that non implicative readings are 
associated with Genericity (as evidenced by the generic interpretation of the bare 
plural). 
We have seen that T &E and the ability modal share the property of being 
implicative with perfective morphology and having their non implicative readings 
associated with genericity. As a working hypothesis, I will assume that T &E are 
at base implicative, as in Bhatt's analysis of the ability modal, and that non 
implicative readings are to be derived through a genericity operator. 
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2.2. The Implicative Nature ofT&E 
The second puzzle that emerges is the behavior of perfective T &E under negation. 
Before we turn to the relevant data, we need to briefly go over Karttunen's  ( 1 97 1 )  
classification o f  implicatives. S o  far I have used the term ' implicative' loosely to 
describe how complements of certain predicates need to hold (or fail to) in the 
actual world. Karttunen coined the term implicatives for those predicates that 
entail the actuality of their complement clause when affirmative (8a), and its 
negation when negated (8b) : 
(8) a. Jean managed to kiss Mary 
-+ Jean kissed Mary 
b. Jean didn't manage to kiss Mary 
-+ Jean didn't kiss Mary 
Karttunen ( 1 97 1) proposes that implicatives involve two dimensions: a level of 
assertion, which consists of the complement clause augmented by the matrix tense 
and modifiers; and a presupposition, consisting of a sufficient and necessary 
condition for the realization of the complement. Thus (8a) and (8b) assert (9a) 
and (9b) respectively, and both presuppose (9c): 
(9) a. Jean kissed Mary 
b. Jean didn't kiss Mary 
c. Jean's  success in kissing M. depended only on his skill and ingenuity 
Turning back to perfective T &E, we can see that they behave exactly like 
implicatives under negation, that is, enough constructions implicate the negation 
of their complement (while too constructions implicate their actualization): 
( 1 0) a. Jean a ete assez rapide pour s 'enfuir (#mais il ne s ' est pas enfui) 
'Jean was-pfv. quick enough to escape (#but he didn't escape) ' 
-+ Jean escaped 
b. Jean n'a pas ete assez rapide pour s 'enfuir (#mais it s 'est enfui) 
'Jean was-pfv. not quick enough to escape (#but he still escaped) ' 
-+ Jean didn 't escape 
While the affirmative ( l Oa) implicates that Jean escaped, the negative ( l Ob) 
implicates that he didn't. What ( l Oa) and ( l Ob) have in common however is that 
there is a relation between a degree of quickness and Jean's  escaping. What 
exactly is this relation? And why should ( 1 0) be a puzzle? 
Before we look at the formal nature of the problem, we need to make 
another digression into the semantics of Gradable Adjectives. I follow von 
Stechow ( 1 984), who analyzes them as relations between individuals and degrees. 
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QUICK(x) is x 's  quickness, that is, the maximal degree to which x is quick: 
( 1 1 )  a .  [quick] = A.<u,-x .  QUICK (x) � d 
b. Jean is 6 '  tall 
c. Jean's height ? 6'  
To understand what is puzzling about the pair of sentences in  ( 1 0), we 
need to  find a proper analysis which can derive the entailment for either the 
affirmative or the negative version of ( 10) and see whether adding a negation 
yields the correct entailment for the other. As we will see, this doesn't go through 
trivially. I will start by deriving the non actualization entailment of ( l Ob). For 
concreteness, I use Heim (2000)/von Stechow et at (2004) semantics for enough 
(and ignore tense and aspect for the moment) : 
( 1 2) -,[Jean's  quickness � 
MAX {d ' :  VweAcc(w*). 1. escapes in w � J. is d' -quick in w} ] 
Jean ' s  quickness < 
MAX {d ' :  Vwe Acc(w*). 1. escapes in w � J. is d ' -quick in w} 
Jean was less quick than the quickness he must have if he escaped 
According to this analysis, the non actualization entailment follows 
straightforwardly: if in all the accessible worlds in which he escaped, Jean had a 
certain degree of quickness, and if his actual quickness is below that degree, it 
follows that the actual world is not one in which he escaped, and hence that he 
didn't escape in the actual world. However, when we turn to the affirmative case 
( l Oa), the analysis breaks down: 
( 1 3) Jean ' s  quickness � 
MAX {d' : VweAcc(w*). 1. escapes in w � J. is d ' -quick in w} 
Jean was quicker than the quickness he must have if he escaped 
In all accessible worlds in which he escaped, Jean had a certain degree of 
quickness, but just because Jean's actual quickness is greater than that degree 
doesn't  entail that he did escape. In other words, in ( 1 3) quickness is a necessary 
condition for escaping, but not a sufficient one. ( 1 3) is compatible with a situation 
where Jean did not escape, not by lack of speed but perhaps by lack of motivation. 
But ( l Oa) is incompatible with such a scenario: Jean has to have escaped (i .e . ,  the 
actuality entailment is not cancelable). 
What we seem to need in ( l Oa) is for quickness to be a sufficient 
condition. We need Jean's quickness to be greater than a minimal degree of 
quickness that guarantees his escape: 
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(14) J. ' s  quickness � 
MIN {d:VweAcc(w*). 1. is d-quick in w -+ J. escapes in w} 
J. was at least as quick as the quickness that ensured that he escaped 
In (14), Jean's quickness is compared to a degree of quickness such that if he had 
that degree of quickness, he escaped. Provided that the accessibility relation is 
reflexive (i.e., includes the actual world), we will infer from this comparison that 
Jean did indeed escape, as he was at least that quick. 
Thus, to account for ( 1 0), we seem to need two degrees of quickness, a 
sufficient one ( I Sa) and a necessary one ( I  Sb): 
( 1 5) a. MIN {d:Vwe Acc(w*). 1. is d-quick in w -+ J. escapes in w} 
b. MAX {d:VweAcc(w*) .  1. is d-quick in w +- J. escapes in w} 
I propose to collapse these two degrees into a single one, by using an iota 
operator, which, in turn, forces an equivalence relation, which I will justify in 
section 3 .2 . :  
( 1 6) td:Vw' e Acc(w). J. is d-quick in w' <-+ 1. escapes in w' 
3. Proposal 
In the previous section, I suggested that in an enough construction, the degree of 
adjective is a sufficient and necessary condition for the realization of the 
complement, or in other words, the relation between the degree of adjective and 
the complement clause is an equivalence.  In this section, I motivate this 
equivalence. I focus on the implicative readings, based on the assumption that 
T &E are at-base implicative. In section 4, I show how to derive non implicative 
readings. 
I will make the following two claims : (i) T &E contain a definite 
description of degrees which triggers a presupposition; (ii) It is this 
presupposition which establishes an equivalence relation between a degree of 
adjective and the realization of the complement. In this sense, my analysis relates 
to Karttunen ( 1 97 1 )  in that implicatives presuppose a sufficient and necessary 
condition for the realization of their complements. I propose the following lexical 
entries4: 
( 1 7) [ enough] = ll'destAQstAx 
P(td:Vw' eAcc(w). Q(w') <-+ P(d)(x)(w'»(x)(w) 
( 1 8) [too] = ll'destAQstAx 
P(td:Vw' eAcc(w). -,Q(w') <-+ P(d)(x)(w'»(x)(w) 
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Thus too and enough take three arguments :  a proposition, a predicate of degrees 
and an individual (in ( 1 0) the arguments are that Jean escaped, quick and Jean). 
3. 1 .  Deriving the implicative reading of enough constructions 
Let's first focus on perfective enough constructions. ( 1 9a) would have the 
meaning paraphrased in ( 1 9b) and the presupposition in ( 1 9c): 
( 1 9) a. Jean a ete assez rapide pour s'enfuir 
'Jean was-pfv. quick enough to escape' 
b. 1. had the degree of quickness sufficient & necessary for him to escape 
c .  There is a degree of quickness sufficient & necessary for him to escape 
I take the contribution of perfective aspect to simply provide existential closure 
over a time variable, and that of the past tense to locate that time variable prior to 
the utterance time. ( 1 9a) will then have the following LF: 
(20) 3t[t<t* & [quick] 
(td:VwEAcc(w*). [J. escape in w <-d .  is d-quick in w])(J)(t)(w*)] 
What is the accessibility relation in (20)? Intuitively, for (20) to be 
meaningful, we would like to fix certain parameters or conditions: we want to 
consider worlds that are very similar to ours, as far as the conditions for escaping 
are concerned (we don't want to consider for instance worlds where there is no 
gravity, and where Jean will therefore float away). Thus the type of modality 
involved in this equivalence seems to be purely circumstantial (cf. Kratzer 1 99 1 ,  
von Fintel and Heim 2002), the type of modality which i s  used 'when we are 
interested in the necessities implied and possibilities opened up by certain facts ' .  
'Circumstantial modality i s  the modality o f  rational agents like gardeners, 
architects or engineers' ,  it has explanatory power. Consider the example in (2 1 ) :  
(2 1 )  I had to sneeze 
In uttering (2 1 )  one does more than simply state a fact (the fact that I sneezed). 
What the modality contributes is a sort of explanation: the circumstances at that 
time (it is the beginning of allergy season, I am outdoors, pollen is flying around 
my nose, etc . . .  ) explain the inevitability of my sneezing: in all of those worlds in 
which these circumstances hold, I sneeze. 
In T &E constructions, we seem to need a similar type of modality which 
restricts the worlds under consideration to those in which certain facts hold. For 
(20), the set of circumstances includes for instance the conditions of entrapment, 
and in all of the worlds in which these circumstances hold, Jean escapes if and 
only if he is d-quick. This type of accessibility relation is reflexive (the actual 
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world is accessible to itself). We can now derive ( 1 9a) 's  actuality entailment (for 
simplicity reasons, I ignore the tense and aspect projections): 
(22) Jean a ete assez rapide pour s 'enfuir 
[quick] (ld:VwEAcc(w*). J. escapes in w ...... 1. is d-quick in w)(J)(w*) 
The presupposition of (22) yields the premise in (23a) and its assertion, the 
premise in (23b). From these two premises, we derive (23c) by Modus Ponens, 
through reflexivity: 
(23) a. P I :  In all acc. worlds w, if Jean was d-quick in w, Jean escaped in w 
b. P2: Jean was d-quick in w* 
c. :. Jean escaped in w* 
We can also derive the negation of (22), and get the correct entailment. 
(24) Jean n'a pas ete assez rapide pour s'enfuir 
'Jean was-pfv. not quick enough to escape' 
-. [quick] (ld:VWE Acc(w*). 1. escapes in w ...... J. is d-quick in w)(J)(w*) 
The presupposition of (24) is the same as that of (22) and yields the premise in 
(25a). The assertion this time yields the premise in (23b). From these two 
premises, we derive (23c) by Modus Toll ens (again through reflexivity): 
(25) a. P I : In all acc. worlds w, if Jean escaped in w, Jean was d-quick in w 
b. P2: Jean was not d-quick in w* 
c .  : .  Jean did not escape in  w* 
3.2. Sufficient and Necessary? 
Arguably, either direction of the biconditional may seem counter-intuitive. First, 
one might question the necessary part of the relation. After all, shouldn't  enough 
mean something like suffice? Consider the pair of sentences in (26) : 
(26) a. Marie n'a pas ete assez belle pour etre elue Miss France. #Son talent a 
aussi joue. 
M. was-pfv not pretty enough to be crowned Miss France. #Her talent 
also counted. 
b. Sa beaute n'a pas suffi a ce qu'elle soit elue Miss France. Son talent a 
aussi joue. 
Her beauty didn't suffice for her to be crowned Miss France. Her 
talent also counted. 
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(26b) is compatible with a scenario in which Marie was elected Miss France 
(thanks in part to the talent show), but that her beauty alone was not sufficient. 
The continuation states that another factor (i .e . ,  talent) also contributed to her 
election. In (26a) however, one infers, as in our other perfective enough 
examples, that the complement didn't take place in the actual world, that is, in 
this case, that Marie was not elected Miss France, hence the continuation is odd, 
as the also is not interpretable. 
Even more worrisome might be the sufficient part of the relation: could it 
be that mere quickness will make one escape? Surely there must be  other 
conditions that should be factored in. The analysis I suggest here makes very 
strong predictions: because of the equivalence in the presupposition, the condition 
given by that presupposition should be the only condition which the realization of 
the complement depends on. If the complement also depends on an additional 
condition, we predict that the sentence should either be odd or that the" two 
conditions should be equivalent. This prediction is in fact borne out. 
Consider the following scenario: I am having a conversation with my 
cousin in Los Angeles about the glamorous life of Hollywood's j et-set. She tells 
me about a very exclusive party on the hills and in the course of the conversation, 
she establishes that in order to get invited, one has to be both rich and famous.  
Her friend Pierre jumps into the conversation and says: 
(27) Nick a eM assez riche pour se faire inviter 
'Nick was-pfv. rich enough to be invited' 
In this context, (27) is a bit odd. Even if I don't know Nick, I get the 
impression that Pierre takes it for granted that he is famous. This oddity is in line 
with what the theory predicts: because Nick has to both be rich and famous, there 
is no degree of richness that can guarantee him getting invited. However, we 
accommodate that Nick is famous beyond the necessary threshold such that Nick 
being rich and famous is equivalent to him being rich. In more formal terms, the 
presupposition triggered by (27) is given in (28a); (28b) is what the background 
provides; (28c) is what the hearer accommodates :  
(28) a. 3d['v'weAcc(w*). N.  invited in w <-+ N. d-rich in w] 
b. 3dI3d2['v'weAcc(w*). N. invited in w <-+ N. d1-rich & drfamous in w] 
c. Nick is d2-famous in all accessible worlds 
The context (28b) doesn't entail the presupposition in (28a) .  However, it does 
once we accommodate (28c). 
To bring the point home, imagine a conversation about another party, 
where this time, one has to either be rich or famous to get invited. Pierre says: 
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(29) Celine n'a pas ete assez riche pour se faire inviter 
'Celine was-pfv. not rich enough to be invited' 
Again, the sentence seems odd. Even if ! don't know Celine, I get the impression 
that Pierre takes it for granted that she is not famous. Once I accommodate (30c), 
the background (30b) entails the presupposition triggered by (29) in (30a)s: 
(30) a. 3d[Vwe Acc(w*). C. invited in w +-+ C. d-rich in w] 
b. 3dad2[Vwe Acc(w*). C. invited in w +-+ C. d)-rich 1\ drfamous in w] 
c. In all accessible worlds, Celine is not drfamous 
3.3. The Dual Relation between Too and Enough 
In this section, I discuss the duality of too and enough. The following sentences 
are supposed to be truth-conditionally equivalent: 
(3 1 )  a. Jean a ete trop lent pour s'enfuir 
' Jean was too slow to escape' 
b. Jean n'a pas ete assez rapide pour s'enfuir 
' Jean was not fast enough to escape' 
Before we can derive the equivalence between (3 1 a) and (3 Ib), we need to make 
a short digression into the polarity of gradable adjectives. The negative pole of an 
antonym pair (such as slow and quick) is treated as the negation of the positive 
pole. QUICK(x) is x 's  quickness, that is the maximal degree to which x is quick. I 
adopt von Stechow's ( 1 984) lexical entries : 
(32) a. [quick] = Ad.Ax. QUICK(x) � d 
b. �low] =  Ad.Ax. -,\Ruick] (d)(x) = Ad.Ax. -,QUICK(x) � d 
As seen at the beginning of section 3, too minimally differs from enough in that 
the equivalence relation is between a degree of adjective and the non-realization 
of the complement (the lexical entries. are repeated below): 
( 1 7) [enough] = APdestAQ.tAx 
P(td:Vw' eAcc(w). Q(w') +-+ P(d)(x)(w'» (x)(w) 
( 1 8) [too] = ),pdestAQ.t Ax 
P(td:Vw' eAcc(w). -,Q(w') +-+ P(d)(x)(w'» (x)(w) 
Sentences (3 1 a) and (3 Ib) have the LFs in (33) and (34) respectively: 
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(33) Jean a ete trop lent pour s ' enfuir 
[slow] (td:VwEAcc(w*). -,[J. escaped]W ...... [J is d-quick] W )(J)(w*) 
'Jean had the degree of slowness that guarantees that he didn't escape' 
(34) Jean n'a pas ete assez rapide pour s 'enfuir 
-, [quick] (td:VwEAcc(w*). [J. escaped]W ...... [J is d-quick]W )(J)(w*) 
'Jean didn't have the quickness that guarantees that he escaped' 
(34) is equivalent to (35b), which in turn is equivalent to (33), once we replace 
[ quick] by the negation of its antonym adjective in (35a), and through the logical 
equivalence -,P ...... -,Q ¢:> p ...... Q in (35b): 
(35) a. [slow] (td:VwEAcc(w*). [J. escaped]W ...... -,[J. is d-slowD W )(J)(w*) 
b. [slow] (td:VwEAcc(w*). -,[J. escaped]W ...... [J.  is d-slow] W )(J)(w*) 
4. Non Implicative Readings of T&E 
We have seen so far that T&E are at base implicative, that is, they entail the 
complement clause (or its non realization). This meaning emerges with perfective 
morphology which reflects the presence of a default existential c losure. In this 
section, I show how the non implicative meaning of T&E results from the 
presence of a genericity operator that can include non actual worlds/situations. 
4. 1 .  A Predecessor: the Ability Modal (Bhatt 1999) 
A predecessor for this interaction between aspect and implication is the ability 
modal as analyzed in Bhatt ( 1 999). Bhatt observes that with perfective, the 
complement clause of an ability modal needs to be actualized (36a), while with 
imperfective it doesn't: (36b): 
(36) a. Jean a pu soulever cette table, #mais il ne l 'a  pas soulevee 
'Jean could-pfv. l ift this table, #but he didn't l ift it' 
b. Jean pouvait soul ever cette table, mais il ne l 'a  pas soulevee 
'Jean could-impf. lift this table, but he didn't lift it' 
Bhatt gives the ability modal the semantics of an implicative predicate 
(like manage), that is, in an ability construction, the assertion consists only of the 
complement clause, and a conventional implicature (cf. Karttunen and Peters 
1 979) relates that some effort went into the realization of the complement. In 
order to derive the non implicative meaning, Bhatt uses a genericity operator 
which doesn't require verifying instances, and is reflected by imperfective 
morphology. 
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As a starting point for T&E I adopt Bhatt' s  insight that imperfective on 
the matrix is a reflection of a genericity operator, which is responsible for the non 
implicative readings of these constructions. In the next section, I give a semantics 
for this operator and show how, when combined with a T&E, it can yield non 
implicative readings. 
4.2. Non-Implicative Readings ofT&E 
Genericity is involved when reporting some kind of generalization over events 
(and/or individuals, but I will abstract from quantification over individuals as it 
not directly relevant), as opposed to referring to some particular events. These 
generalizations have a law-like flavor, while still allowing for some exceptions. 
Consider the following example: 
(37) a. John walks to school 
b. Mary handles the mail from Antarctica 
(37a) is judged to be true even if, occasionally, John's mother drives him to 
school. As long as most of the events of John going to school involve him 
walking there, the sentence can be used felicitously, as if a silent ''usually'' were 
present in the sentence. (37b) is also judged to be true even if Mary has never yet 
received mail from Antarctica: should such mail arrive however, it would be 
Mary's responsibility to handle it. Somehow then, the generalization is made 
about a particular set of events, namely those events that are deemed relevant for 
the generalization to hold. 
A fairly common approach to genericity is to postulate a covert operator 
(GEN) which universally quantifies over situations/worlds (cf. Krifka et al. 1 995 
and references therein). This set of worlds/situations is somehow restricted to the 
'relevant' or 'normal' ones, in order to allow for exceptions. Thus (37a) would be 
paraphrased as 'in all normallrelevant situations, John walks to school '. An 
instance of his mother driving him would not be considered a normaVrelevant 
situation, thus it would leave the generalization unharmed. 
Much about the precise nature of this operator hasn't been completely 
settled (Should we have only one operator to handle all generic statements? 
Should it quantify over worlds or situations? Should there be a distinct operator 
for individual variables? How does one define which situation/world is relevant?). 
However a common enough trait of many accounts is that GEN should involve 
universal quantification over relevant worlds/situations, where 'relevant' is 
defined in terms of normalcy. I will try to stay as theory-neutral as possible in my 
use of this operator and choose a modal implementation for simplicity (universal 
quantification over worlds) but nothing hinges on this choice and my proposal 
could be recast in terms of situations. 
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In a modal account, the worlds being quantified over will be obtained 
through an accessibility relation which picks worlds in terms of norma1cl . The 
set of worlds can be further restricted by context or by an overt adverbial. GEN 
basically has the semantics of a universal modal (with the possible difference that 
the accessibility relation is fixed) : it quantifies over accessible worlds further 
restricted by an overt or contextually-provided proposition p, and in all those 
worlds that satisfy the restriction, the proposition q holds : 
(3 8) [GEN] (P)(q) = Vw' [w' EAcc(w) /\ pew')] � q(w') 
(37b) will be handled as follows: the context adds to the restriction the 
proposition that mail arrives from Antarctica, and in all of these worlds, Mary 
handles that mail (I will from now ort use the simplified notation in (39b) : 
(39) a. Vw' [w' EAcc(w) /\ mail arrive from A. in w'] � M. handle mail in w' 
b. GEN[w' ](mail arrives from A. in w'); (M. handles mail in w') 
Going back to T &E, GEN can be added to yield a non implicative meaning: 
(40) a. Jean est assez rapide pour s'enfuir 
'Jean is-impf quick enough to escape' 
b. GEN[w](J. has the sufficient/necessary quickness to escape in w) 
c. "In all relevant worlds Jean has the quickness to escape". 
We, of course, need to be a bit more precise. What are these relevant worlds, and 
incidentally, what happens to the presupposition? The answer to the second 
question will provide one to the first, and comes from Schubert and Pelletier 
( 1 989) which proposes that presuppositions get accommodated into the restriction 
of the genericity operator. 
In (4 1 a), the predicate land-on-one 's-feet presupposes that the subject is 
dropped to the ground. This presupposition is accommodated into the restriction 
of the genericity operator, which gives the paraphrase in ( 41 b): 
(41 )  a .  Cats land o n  their feet 
b. ' In all worlds where they drop to the ground, cats land on their feet' .  
I propose that T&E's  presuppositions also get accommodated into the 
restriction of the genericity operator, which has the effect of restricting the set of 
worlds to those that strictly depend on the subject's  degree of adjective (Jean's 
quickness in (42)): 
ASPECfS OF TOO AND ENOUGH CONSTRUCTIONS 
(42) GEN[W](3d: VW' E Acc(w) 1. is d-quick in w' ...... J. escapes in w' ; 
J. is d-quick in w) 
"In every normal world where there is a degree of quickness that 
guarantees his escape, Jean has that degree of quickness". 
Crucially, the worlds in this set are highly idealized: again, we are looking at 
worlds that strictly depend on quickness. One can easily see that the actual world 
may not be in this- set. For example, it could be that in reality, Jean is not smart 
enough: in that case, there would be no degree of quickness that guarantees his 
escape. This is precisely what we want for the non implicative reading, where the 
complement clause need not be actualized. 
To close this section, I would like to elaborate a bit on the nature of the 
accessibility relation of the genericity operator. There is a remaining question 
about whether the accessibility relation should be fixed or whether generic 
statements can have different modal flavors, and in particular, whether they can 
have deontic readings. Consider the following example: 
(43) Dog owners pay taxes on them 
(43) has a deontic feel and could be paraphrased as follows: ' in all worlds in 
which the laws are obeyed, dog owners pay taxes' .  Greenberg (2002) for instance 
take sentences like (43) to argue that indeed the accessibility relation can be 
deontic. However, two factors may cast some doubt on whether we are really 
dealing here with true deontic modality: one is that (43) cannot be continued by a 
sentence that denies that dog owners don't pay taxes in reality, whereas a true 
deontic (e.g., Dog owners should pay taxes on them) is fine with such a 
continuation. Another factor is that the distribution of such deontically-flavored 
generic statements seems quite limited. If it turns out that we really want to 
disallow a deontic accessibility relation, the question arises about how to interpret 
those T&E sentences that seem to have a natural deontic reading, as in (44): 
(44) Mary is old enough to drink 
I would like to argue that even if one were to fix the type of accessibility relation 
available to GEN, sentences like (44) could still retain their deontic flavor, as all 
of the work is done by the accommodation of the presupposition into the 
restriction. Indeed, in (44) the presupposition restricts the set of worlds in which 
the generalization holds to those that strictly depend on age. What could these 
worlds be? Clearly they represent a very small set of worlds, where consideration 
of the laws of nature or physics is almost irrelevant. There's  nothing particularly 
natural or physical about one 's age that associates a certain age with drinking, and 
we will tend to accommodate that legal considerations may be at play. Because 
the worlds quantified over are those and only those in which there is an age limit 
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for drinking, we take those to worlds to be worlds in which a man-made law is 
obeyed, and a deontic flavor arises7• 
To sum up, the non implicative reading of T &E is due to the 
accommodation of the presupposition into the restriction of the genericity 
operator. This forces one to only consider worlds that strictly depend on the 
adjective. There are many ways in which actual world might be different, thus the 
complement clause may not hold in actuality. 
5. Further Issues 
5. 1 .  Perfect Readings of the Perfective 
What I have glossed so far as the perfective is the passe compose, which in 
French is ambiguous between a preterit (the use we have seen so far) and a perfect 
(cf. Smith 1 99 1 ) . Note that the preterit reading is incompatible with adverbs like 
toujours. Thus (45) has to have a perfect reading, and, as it turns out, in that case, 
we don't  have an actuality entailment: 
(45) Jean a toujours ete assez sobre pour conduire. Mais sa femme ne l 'a  
jamais laisse, parce qU'elle ne lui fait pas confiance. 
'Jean was-pfv. always sober enough to drive . But his wife never let 
him because she doesn't trust him'. 
In (45) the continuation implies that the complement clause didn't take place. 
Contrast with (46): 
(46) Bier, Jean a ete assez sobre pour conduire. #Mais sa femme ne l 'a  
pas laisse, parce qu'elle ne lui fait pas confiance. 
'Yesterday, Jean was-pfv. sober enough to drive. #But his wife 
didn't  let him because she doesn't trust him' . 
The crucial difference is that in (45) we have universal quantification over events, 
whereas (46) has existential closure. (45) seems to involve a Perfect of a generic 
(Perfect + Genericity Operator), which is morphologically realized as the passe 
compose in French, as can be seen in the example below: 
(47) Jusqu'a present, la cigogne migratrice a toujours passe l 'hiver en Afrique. 
'Until now, the migrating stork has always spent winter in Africa' .  
Thus the generalization that 'perfective ' morphology (passe compose) 
entails implicativity needs to be fine-tuned. It appears instead that the morphology 
reflects the presence of operators, which are in turn responsible for actuality 
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entailments or lack thereof. The genenclty operator is generally reflected by 
imperfective (imparfait). However, if a Perfect scopes over it, its presence won't 
be transparent in the morphology. 
5.2. Perspectives on Implicatives and Modals 
To wrap up, I want to briefly talk about the ramifications of this analysis of T&E 
to other constructions that seem to share the property that their implicative 
behavior is contingent on matrix aspect. In this account of T &E, I have proposed 
to treat T &E as being at-base implicative, and as being able to combine with a 
genericity operator to yield non implicative readings. A similar account was 
proposed for the ability modal (Bhatt 1 999). I would like to point out another type 
of construction that seems to pattern the same way, HA VE-THE-X-TO/ :  
(48) a. Jean a eu Ie courage de parler it Marie, #mais il ne lui a pas parle. 
' Jean had-pfv. the courage to talk to Marie, #but he didn't  talk to her' . 
b. Jean avait Ie courage de parler it Marie, mais il ne lui a pas parle. 
' Jean had-impf the courage to talk to Marie, but he didn't talk to her ' .  
Here we even have morphological evidence for a defmite description (with the 
definite article). We can straightforwardly extend the T &E analysis to this 
construction: 
(49) Jean a eu Ie courage/Ie temps/la force de parler it Marie 
' Jean had-pfv the courage/time/strength to talk to Marie' 
J. has [ld:VwEAcc(w*). [J. talks to M. in w ...... J .  has d-courage in w]­
courage in w* 
So far we have seen implicatives being sensitive to aspect. However, some 
implicatives never have non implicative readings. With imperfective, the only 
possible reading is a habitual one (with verifYing instances). (50a) illustrates the 
manage type, and (SOb) the HA VE-THE-X-TO] type: 
(50) a. Jean reussissait it parler it Marie ??(it chaque fois qu'il la voyait) 
'Jean succeeded-imp to talk to Mary ??(every time he saw her) , 
b. Jean avait Ie plaisir de parler it Marie ??(tous les vendredis) 
' Jean had-imp the pleasure to talk to Marie ??(every Friday), 
Thus one remaining issue is what differentiates those implicatives that are 
sensitive to aspect from those that are insensitive to it. (50a) was particularly 
worrisome for Bhatt 's account, which gives able the semantics of manage, despite 
this crucial difference in implicative behavior. I leave it for further research to 
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determine which potential differences between perfective implicatives and real 
implicatives are crucial. Such potential differences may include lexical meanings 
(which will trigger different presuppositions) or interactions between different 
inner and outer aspects. 
6. Conclusion 
Based on the parallel with the ability modal (cf. Bhatt 1 999), I have proposed that 
T &E are at-base implicative. The puzzling implicative behavior of T &E is due to 
a presupposed equivalence relation between a degree of adj ective and a 
complement clause triggered by a definite description of degrees. Imperfective 
reflects the presence of a genericity operator, responsible for the non implicative 
readings. This operator quantifies over a set of idealized worlds (created by the 
accommodation of the presupposition), which doesn't necessarily include the 
actual world. 
Endnotes 
* I am most indebted to I.  Heim. Many thanks to P. Anand, D. Biiring, E.  Chemla, 
K. von Fintel, D. Fox, J. Gajewski, S. latridou, N. Klinedinst, R. Pancheva, P. 
Schlenker, R. Schwarzchild, D. Sportiche, the participants of Sinn und Bedeutung 
9, UCLA Semantics Lunch and SALT 15 for helpful discussion. 
I I follow Karttunen's  terminology here: ' implicate ' is used as a neutral term as to 
whether this is an entailment, a presupposition or an implicature. 
2In this paper, I focus on the Past tense, as French doesn't differentiate for aspect 
in the Present or the Future. 
3Further problems with previous accounts are discussed in Hacquard (2004). 
4For the purposes of the presentation, I abstract away from the syntactic structure 
of T&E constructions. 
5The judgments also conform to the prediction, once we inverse the two scenarios 
and the two target sentences. In a context where Nick has to be both rich and 
famous and Pierre says: "Nick n 'a pas be assez riche pour se faire inviter", I 
infer that he takes it for granted that Nick is famous (thus being rich and famous 
is equivalent to being rich), and in a context where he has to either be rich or 
famous, and Pierre says: "Nick a be assez riche pour se fa ire inviter", I infer that 
he takes it for granted that Nick is not famous. 
6The sort of genericity involved in T &E is similar to that of dispositional 
generics, whose modal base has been argued to consist of intrinsic properties of 
the subject in virtue of which the generalization holds (cf. Greenberg 2002, 
Lekakou 2003). 
7possibly, a similar explanation could handle cases like (43), once we look more 
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closely at the sort of presuppositions associated with such statements. 
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